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Bob Cover was not content with the world. In his legal scholarship, this
discontent expressed itself as a demand that law be "redemptive" in its
aspiration, acknowledging the "unredeemed character of reality as we
know it" and seeking to replace it with a "fundamentally different
reality."l Bob lived in this normative aspiration not only in his secular
legal scholarship but in his absorbing involvement with Torah. Indeed, he
would not recognize the secular and religious dimensions of law as
distinct in any important sense. There was no part of Bob's life-whether
characterized as legal, religious, personal-that was not touched by his
passion for redemptive transformation.
Bob's involvement in the Civil Rights struggle was a central experience
in his commitment to transform the "unredeemed character of reality."
Though his deep aversion to coercion deployed by constituted social
authority spoke directly to our generation's experience of the Vietnam
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War, the Civil Rights movement was more formative for him, especially
in his confrontation with the raw violence of racist subordination that the
movement brought into open view in the early 1960s. I had known from
Bob that, as a college and law school student, he had gone South as a civil
rights worker and I knew too that he had been arrested and spent what I
gathered was a brief time, perhaps even just one night, in a rural Southern
jail. In my oral presentation at this conference, I mentioned these facts as
part of my understanding of Bob's thinking.
After my presentation, Bob's brother Arnie told me that I did not know
the complete story. I am sure that the limitations of my knowledge came
from Bob's modesty, his unwillingness to make any show of his virtues. I
asked Arnie if he would write a fuller account of Bob's experience, which
I might quote in this published version of my presentation. Arnie agreed,
and this account followed:
As you requested, I am sending you some information about Bob's
imprisonment in Georgia. Bob went down to work in the voter
registration campaign of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee after completing his sophomore year at Princeton in 1963.
He intended to work there only for the summer; he had received a
fellowship to study in Taiwan for his junior year (he had been taking
Chinese and was considering majoring in Economics of the Far East).
Not long after he went through SNCC's training, there was a
crackdown and all of the civil rights workers in the area were arrested
on various charges. One young woman avoided arrest, and she hid
out in the basement of a black church. The church had no phone, so
she would sneak out after dark to call the families of the others on a
pay phone. We heard from her that Bob had been arrested a few days
after it actually happened. We were told that SNCC workers did not
want to be bailed out, since the authorities were wont to arrest civil
rights workers on charges that would not stand up under
constitutional scrutiny, and after they were bailed out the government
would simply keep the money and never call up the cases.
We did not receive much information while Bob was in jail. I
believe that they were transferred to a different facility after a night
or two in a horrendous lock-up where huge cockroaches crawled over
them through the night (perhaps this followed their conviction). 1 do
not have the expertise to access all of the details, but I did find on the
internet that the case was Albany v. Giddens, Cover, Allen.2 They
were arrested for handing out notices of a civil rights meeting and
charged with violating an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of
2. Civil Liberties Docket, 55.49 (Aug. 1963), at http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/meiklejohnlmeik-
8_4/meik-8_4-4.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2004) ("Defs. handing out notices of civil rights meeting.
Arrested: violating ordinance prohibiting distribution of advertising matter. Convicted; 30 days or
$55. Two Defs. beaten when put in jail with 6 white men. Appeal pending.").
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advertising material. They were convicted and sentenced to thirty
days or a $55.00 fine. Bob was in a cell with one other SNCC
worker (I believe it was Ralph Allen) who later that summer was one
of the civil rights workers charged with attempting to incite an
insurrection-a capital offense-in Americus, Georgia, and six other
white prisoners.
The two SNCC workers refused to report for work detail, and they
went on a hunger strike. The reason for the strike was to up the ante
for the authorities, who would have to pay for a doctor to examine
them each day. I believe that the hunger strike lasted for seventeen
days. Finally, the authorities told the other prisoners, one of whom I
recall was a sergeant in the army with martial arts training, that they
would be released early if they saw to it that the SNCC workers
reported for work detail. Bob and the other SNCC worker were
severely beaten. At that point it had become too dangerous to remain
in jail, and they secured their release. There was, at some point
during or just after their ordeal, an article in the New York Times
about their situation.3
When Bob was able to communicate with our parents, he informed
them that he was not badly hurt and that he and his cellmate had been
checked out by a doctor. He wrote to me (I was at camp), and
instructed me not to tell our parents that the doctor who had checked
them out was a veterinarian, since there was no medical doctor in
southwest Georgia who would treat a civil rights worker (at least
when not in custody).
Bob felt that working for civil rights was more important than
studying in Taiwan, so he forfeited his fellowship and stayed in
Georgia. I believe that it was in early December that Bob was home
for a brief visit. He was trying to find a market for homemade quilts
that were being produced by a cooperative that had been formed to
try to develop a source of income for blacks that was not dependent
on the white power structure. While he was addressing a United
Synagogue Youth convention about the struggle for civil rights, Bob
was informed that the house in which he stayed in Georgia had been
machine-gunned, and the woman whose house it was had been
injured. Bob felt that he could not remain safely in the North at a
time of such danger to those in the Movement in his community. He
borrowed money for a plane ticket (SNCC workers received $3.86 a
week-when there were sufficient funds to pay them) and a ride to
the airport from a friend, and he flew back to Georgia without even
going home for his things.
3. Claude Sitton, Students Persist in Georgia Drive, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1963, at 17.
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Since Bob had taken the year off instead of studying at Princeton, he
lost his student deferment from the draft. He had to return home to
appear before the draft board, and he was eventually able to get his
II-S restored.
While in law school, Bob returned to Albany, Georgia, for the
summer to work for civil rights lawyer C.B. King (I am sure that
neither of them could have imagined that the Federal Courthouse in
Albany would be named after King in 2002). In his letters to Diane,
Bob frequently talked about how dangerous things were at that time.
One day, Bob and several black associates were driving in a county
that had a notoriously racist sheriff. When they passed a store in
front of which a number of white men were hanging out, the young
men saw them, grabbed things like ax handles and baseball bats, ran
to a car, and took off after them at high speed. Bob's car accelerated,
with Bob attempting to get low enough that the racial make-up of the
car might not be obvious (apparently a warrant was later issued for a
white male with a large head). The road got narrower and narrower
as it entered some woods, and finally it just ended. The driver of
Bob's car turned it around and began racing back in the opposite
direction; they knew that a face-to-face confrontation would be
extremely serious and probably fatal (this was after the deaths of
Schwerner, Goodman, and Chaney, among others). They sped
towards a head-on collision with their pursuers, and when the other
car swerved at the last moment they veered over the edge of the road
and were able to get past the other car and escape.4
Beneath the elegant sweep of Nomos and Narrative, the entire article
could be read as a re-enactment of Bob's head-on confrontation with his
murderous pursuers. It comes to life, it leaps from the pages of the
Harvard Law Review because of the risks Bob was willing to take in his
pursuit of redemptive possibility. But the brute power of Bob's
adversaries, and his narrow, even improbable, escape also speak to the
intimations of "despair and withdrawal" that Robert Post sees in this
article.s As Post also notes, these intimations do not mean that Bob was
wrong in what he saw or said. As I understand Bob's vision, he struggled
continuously with the question whether his thirst for redemptive
transformation could ever be satisfied-in any context, legal, religious,
personal.
The distinction between jurispathic and jurisgenerative social
institutions is central to Nomos and Narrative. This distinction is one
;,
4. E-mails from Arnold Cover to Professor Robert A. Burt (Apr. 26, 2004, 3:01 pm and Apr. 27,
2004,2:39 pm) (on file with author). .
5. Robert Post, Who's Afraid ofJurispathic Courts?: Violence and Public Reason in Nomos and
Narrative, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 9,15 (2005).
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expression of Bob's struggle, a claim that redemptive communal life was
possible only insofar as violence was entirely purged from the communal
relationship. Thus judges, like all state actors with coercive sanctions at
their disposal, were intrinsically disqualifiej from the true transformative
enterprise. Bob's famous dictum that "judges are people of violence ...
[and therefore] do not create law but kill it,"6 does not, however,
adequately acknowledge the pervasiveness of violence in all social life.
Contrary to Bob's apparent claim, judges and other state officials are not
unique avatars of violence.
It may be that officials' easy, even routine, access to overwhelming
coercive weaponry makes them more inclined to redemptive failures in
Bob's terms. It may be that Bob's loving absorption in Torah took hold
for him from the historical contingency that Jewish law developed in the
diaspora without access to any directly coercive state enforcement
apparatus. But this contingent characteristic of Jewish law does not
support the strong categorical distinction that Bob posits.
If we more clearly acknowledge than Bob did, that state-administered
violence is not the only communal instrument for coercive impositions of
submission, then we must discard Bob's strong categories and instead
choose between two alternatives for avoiding violent social coercions.
One is that state officials, including judges, are in principle capable of
eschewing violence in the service of social transformations, even though
this does not frequently occur in practice. (A variant of this alternative
could be that judges charged with the enforcement of constitutional norms
are, unlike other state officials, uniquely capable of this transformative
practice because they possess no power of the "sword or the purse ... but
merely judgment."?) A second alternative is that redemptive
transformation of the kind Bob envisioned cannot be achieved in any
communal setting, that notwithstanding Bob's contrary longing, some
coercive structure is necessarily embedded in all social relations. Perhaps
one might say that coercion must accompany any aggregate social
relationship but can be avoided or transcended in direct, face-to-face,
interpersonal relationships. Or perhaps this is not attainable in any social
relationship but is only a possibility for individuals in contemplative
solitude. Or perhaps not even in solitude, conscience-driven as we may be
by internalized images of external authority that deprive us of any
subjective conviction of freely chosen acquiescence.
Bob never chose among these alternatives. I believe that Bob
romanticized the jurisgenerative potential of non-statist communal
enterprises because, if forced to choose between the alternatives I have
6. Cover, supra note I, at 53.
7. So Alexander Hamilton classically observed, in THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 378 (Terence Ball
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
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posited, he could only see his way toward choosing the second-and he
was unwilling to accept the implications of social isolation, of "despair
and withdrawal," that this choice implied. There was thus an ineradicable
tension in Bob's thinking, captured nicely by Avi Soifer's observation that
Bob was "an anarchist who loved law."g
This tension can be seen in Bob's treatment of Bob Jones University v.
United States,9 the climactic and most extensively considered Supreme
Court decision in Nomos and Narrative. From a conventional liberal
perspective, the decision was easy: the University forbade interracial
dating or marriage among its students, the Internal Revenue Service
concluded that this racist policy disqualified the University from tax
exempt status as a charitable institution, and the Supreme Court upheld the
IRS ruling. This result was not easily justified, however, from Bob's
perspective. The University based its policy on a fundamentalist reading
of a Biblical reference to race separatism and could claim respect in Bob's
terms "as a normative community entitled to protection against statist
encroachment."lo Bob's rejoinder was that the University's claim of
"nomic insularity" might only be overridden by the "narrative of
redemption" expressed in a national commitment to repent our history of
racist subordination. II
Bob was, however, critical of the Supreme Court's affirmation of the
IRS ruling on the ground that the Court treated the case only as an issue of
statutory interpretation, by explicitly holding that the IRS correctly
interpreted congressional intent in the tax code and implicitly affirming
that Congress had constitutional authority to withhold favorable tax status
from racially discriminatory enterprises. Bob demanded more than this
from the Court. He insisted that the only possible path toward justifying
the Court's result would be its holding that Congress was constitutionally
obliged to withhold federal tax favors from all racial discriminators,
including Bob Jones University.
The University's claim could itself be understood in Bob's terms as an
aspiration to transform the "unredeemed character of reality" of the post-
Brown l2 universe with a "fundamentally different reality" of biblically
commanded racial separation.13 This understanding raised the stakes for
the University's adversaries; nothing less than an equivalent ambition to
transform an unredeemed world could even begin to assert justifiable
priority over the University's normative claim. In American
8. Aviam Soifer, Covered Bridges, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 55, 59 (2005).
9. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
10. Cover, supra note 1, at 62.
11. [d. at 62, 65.
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Cover, supra note I, at 34.
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jurisprudence, Bob argued, this kind of redemptive commitment only
exists in constitutional commandments, not in discretionary acts of
Congress. The University's normative claim, Bob concluded, could
therefore not be overcome by a mere statute but only by a direct
constitutional command.
This position has, however, the ironic consequence that the University's
claim for normative autonomy-for "insularity" from the national
commitment against race discrimination-eould only be overridden if the
Court was prepared to crush it entirely and irreversibly. By restricting its
ruling to statutory grounds, the Court provided the University with an
opportunity for appeal to Congress, an opening to argue that their
scripturally based normative vision might obtain a respectful exemption
from the generally applicable national policy against race discrimination.
Notwithstanding his claim that judicial deployment of coercive force is
violent and 'jurispathic" at its core, Bob was unwilling to endorse the
Court's offer of some negotiating possibilities in refusing to deploy its
most coercive weaponry, the irresistible force of the Constitution as such,
against Bob Jones University. Having understood the struggle between
the federal tax authorities and the University in Manichean terms, as a
conflict between irreconcilable, diametrically opposed visions of Good
and Evil, Bob appeared to demand nothing less than Armageddon.
Bob's embrace of redemptive struggle led him not only to criticize the
Court but all of the participants in the litigation. He disparaged the
University's position on the ground that it had "once interpreted its
controlling biblical texts to require that no unmarried black person be
admitted to the school" and that it had altered this policy to admit blacks
but forbid interracial dating or marriage only "after the power of the state
was invoked to deny the University favorable tax status."14 Thus, Bob
concluded, the University "seemed uncommitted and lackadaisical in its
racist interpretation-unwilling to put much on the line."ls It may seem
comical that Bob would criticize the University on the ground that it was
insufficiently rigorous in its disrespect toward Black people. But Bob was
dead serious; he did not respect the University because it was "unwilling
to put much on the line."
This was the basis for Bob's disdain toward everyone involved in the
case. The "whole show," he said, "was built on shoddy commitments,
fake interpretations"-not just the University's "uncommitted and
lackadaisical" racism, but all others:
The IRS ruling was left shamefully undefended by an administration
unwilling to put anything on the line for the redemptive principle.
14. Cover, supra note 1, at 51.
15. Id.at67.
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The Justices responded in kind: they were unwilling to venture
commitment of themselves, to make a firm promise and to project
their understanding of the law onto the future. Bob Jones University
is a play for 1983-wary and cautious actors, some eloquence, but no
commitment. 16
Bob did not acknowledge that this wariness and caution on the part of all
of the participants could work toward the goal of controlling, or at least
attenuating, the violence endemic to law, that it offered room for
negotiation and compromise among adversaries initially committed to
defeat one another.
Disdain for those "casting their cautious eyes about" and passionate
commitment for always putting "much [if not everything] on the line"
were at the core of Bob's life. 17 This conviction not only pervaded his
scholarship. It was apparent to anyone who spent even a moment in his
presence. As a friend and colleague, I was awed and intimidated by this
aspect of Bob's character. I never could decide whether I aspired to
emulate him and was embarrassed, even ashamed, at my shortfall, or
. whether I was content to have followed a more cautious and well-
protected course. The lesson that Bob lived, however, was that choices
must be made, that no one can honestly expect to walk both sides of this
line. Risk-filled, full-hearted commitment was his chosen path.
16. [d.
17. [d.
